27 ideas
| 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| 1554 | Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind] |
| 1555 | People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus] |
| 1543 | He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus] |
| 535 | The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus] |